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Nicole E. Negowetti 
Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science 
Primer for Civil Litigators 
 
Abstract.  Cognitive science has revealed that past experiences and prior 
assumptions, even those of which we are not conscious, greatly influence 
how humans perceive the world.  Emerging research has demonstrated that 
attorneys and judges, like everyone else, are the products of their gender, 
ethnicity, race,  and socioeconomic status.  As a consequence, legal 
decision-making is susceptible to the subtle influences of implicit bias.  
Effective and ethical client advocacy requires an attorney to understand 
how her own implicit biases will affect her interactions with clients.  An 
attorney should also acknowledge that implicit biases may affect a judge’s 
interpretation of her client’s story and legal arguments.  This Article 
explains how insights from cognitive science should inform an attorney’s 
representation of clients in civil litigation. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Most lawyers mistakenly view reason and logic as both the primary 
motivator of their behavior and the primary tool to change the thinking 
and behavior of others.  However, emerging cognitive science research has 
revealed that our seemingly neutral, logical, and reasoned judgments are 
actually influenced by unconscious frameworks of thinking about the 
world that are triggered by our autonomic nervous system.1  It is now 
generally understood that the impact of past experiences and prior 
assumptions, even those of which we are not conscious, can have great 
power in directing all humans’ present perceptions, judgments, feelings, 
and behaviors.2  Underlying our thinking is a complex system of 
unconscious judgments of people, places, and situations, of which we are 
unaware.3 
Humans create blueprints based on prior experiences to evaluate new 
situations, people, and themselves.4  We rely on mental shortcuts, which 
psychologists often refer to as “heuristics” or “schemas,” to make complex 
decisions.5  As with other schemas, stereotypes can facilitate the rapid 
categorization of people and allow us to “save cognitive resources.”6  
However, reliance on these cognitive shortcuts can also lead to erroneous 
and biased judgments.7  While “explicit” biases are attitudes and 
 
1. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on 
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1217 (2004). 
2. ZIVA KUNDA, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE, SOCIAL COGNITION 211 (1999). 
3. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: 
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121 (1994) (“One 
reason we have used the term contamination is to draw an analogy to contamination in the physical 
realm . . . .  One difference between physical and mental contamination, however, concerns their ease 
of detection.  It is much more difficult to detect mental contamination, particularly at the individual 
level.”). 
4. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, VT. L. REV. 681, 
700 (1994) (explaining the “mental blueprints” humans use for quick assessments of new experiences, 
based on prior experiences). 
5. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations.”). 
6. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700 
(1994) (“These [schemas] allow us to economize on mental energy: we need not interpret things 
afresh when there are preexisting categories that cover the experience or condition in question.”); see 
also C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About Others, 
51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2000) (“In attempting to make sense of other people, we regularly 
construct and use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception 
process.”). 
7.  Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic Cognitive 
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stereotypes that are consciously accessible through introspection, “implicit” 
biases are not consciously accessible.8  These biases are more likely to 
emerge during stressful situations or when someone must make a decision 
under time constraints.9  Regardless of conscious and explicit desires for 
unbiased decision-making, implicit biases “can produce behavior that 
diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles.”10  
Furthermore, studies have shown that when a person believes himself to be 
objective, he is more susceptible to biases.11 
In light of this research, “[w]hat, if anything, should we do about 
implicit bias in the courtroom?  In other words, how concerned should we 
be that judges, advocates, litigants, and jurors come to the table with 
implicit biases that influence how they interpret evidence, understand 
facts, parse legal principles, and make judgment calls?”12  As lawyers, our 
ethical obligations to our clients and the justice system require us to be 
very concerned about implicit bias in our courtrooms.  These issues have 
not only captured the attention of academics and scientists, but also the 
American Bar Association, the National Center for State Courts, and the 
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System have 
recognized that implicit biases present a serious problem for the 
administration of justice in the legal system, and they have thus 
implemented initiatives to address the issue.13  Our adversarial system 
 
Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44, 44 (2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); see also 
Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012) (explaining 
that our decisions are influenced by “a long litany of biases”).  See generally Jean R. Sternlight & 
Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and 
Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437 (2008) (applying psychological insights to 
the practice of law). 
8. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012). 
9. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1229 (2004) (contending that to 
overcome implicit bias, a person must not “already be too cognitively busy or occupied” when 
receiving new information because “the more cognitively busy individuals are,” the more those 
individuals must rely on schemas and stereotypes to guide judgments). 
10. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). 
11. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012) 
(citing Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-
Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 207, 210-11 (2007)) (reviewing a study where participants that were primed to see 
themselves as objective actually showed more bias in their evaluations of a potential employee). 
12. Id. at 1126 (emphasis omitted). 
13. See PAMELA M. CASEY, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS 
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/ 
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strives to be fair, predictable, and uniform.14  The rule of law would be 
compromised if case outcomes varied because of a judge’s social status or 
because a litigant is from a minority group.15 
Attorneys16 and judges17 are not immune from these influences, 
although most would consider themselves to be objective and fair-
minded.18  A federal district court judge explained how his self-confidence 
in colorblindness was shaken after he received the results of the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) that measures implicit racial bias:  
I was eager to take the test.  I knew I would “pass” with flying colors.  I 
didn’t. 
. . .  After much research, I ultimately realized that the problem of implicit 
bias is a little recognized and even less addressed flaw in our legal system . . . .  
I have discovered that we unconsciously act on implicit biases even though 
we abhor them when they come to our attention.  Implicit biases cause 
subtle actions, . . . [b]ut they are also powerful and pervasive enough to affect 
decisions about whom we employ, whom we leave on juries, and whom we 
believe.  Jurors, lawyers, and judges do not leave behind their implicit biases 
when they walk through the courthouse doors.19 
 
media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx 
(evaluating the programs implemented by three states to reduce the effect of implicit bias); NATALIE 
KNOWLTON & MALIA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 32 (2012), available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/ 
IAALS_Level_the_Playing_Field_FINAL.pdf (providing empirically based strategies for reducing 
implicit bias in the judicial system); Task Force on Implicit Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (educating lawyers 
and judges about the “pervasive implications and effects of implicit bias”); Gender and Racial Fairness 
Resource Guide, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/ 
Gender-and-Racial-Fairness/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (describing state efforts 
to eliminate bias in the courtroom through the creation of task forces). 
14. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, 
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 349 (2012). 
15. Id. 
16. One study showed that even death penalty defense lawyers—who are perceived as 
committed to racial justice and equality—harbor the same implicit biases held by the majority of 
Americans.  Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty 
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004). 
17. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
706 (2013) (asserting that judges “most assuredly” have implicit biases). 
18. See id. (“Of course, ‘[m]ost judges view themselves as objective and especially talented at 
fair decision[-]making.’” (quoting Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1124, 1172 (2012))). 
19. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. 
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Recent legal scholarship—applying cognitive science research to address 
the impact of implicit bias on decision-making20—has focused on how 
judges can mitigate the effects of their own implicit biases.21  These 
solutions call for decisionmakers to understand that they are predisposed to 
making irrational, biased decisions.22  Less attention, however, has been 
given to the role of attorneys in recognizing their own predispositions to 
implicit bias and how cognitive science research should inform their 
advocacy.23  The goal of this Article is to make a modest contribution to 
the implicit bias legal scholarship by identifying some pitfalls of implicit 
biases in client representation and outlining several strategies for effective 
advocacy in light of cognitive science research. 
An attorney must first understand how implicit biases affect her own 
thinking and thus, her relationship with her client.  In the following 
section, this Article presents a brief overview of some of the relevant 
cognitive science research to frame the discussion of how attorneys’ 
decisions are influenced by implicit biases.  It explains why attorneys must 
be vigilant about relying on their assumptions, and proposes some practical 
solutions for mitigating the effects of implicit biases in the representation 
of clients.  Section III discusses how knowledge of implicit biases and their 
effect on judicial decision-making should inform an attorney’s case 
strategies.  In other words, how can attorneys present their cases in ways 
that will help judges avoid deferring to their implicit biases?  Although 
attorneys may appeal to a judge’s biases and predilections when it is 
favorable to their client’s positions, this Article is concerned with the 
pejorative effects of implicit biases in the courtroom, and takes the position 
 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010). 
20. The effects of implicit biases on jury decisions have also been studied.  See generally Anna 
Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 
(2012) (exploring the effect of implicit bias on the jury process and discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of various proposals to remedy the effect of implicit bias). 
21. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1169 (2012) 
(offering strategies to mitigate the effects of implicit bias); Nicole Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, 
Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (arguing that judicial empathy is a 
prerequisite for moving judges “away from their own biased vantage point”). 
22. Cf. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1172 (2012) 
(urging judges and jurors to doubt their own objectivity in order to reduce the effects of their implicit 
biases). 
23. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1272 (2002) (“[T]he main purpose of this Article . . . is to inform advocacy 
practice with current science [regarding stereotypes and prejudice] and to encourage other legal 
scholars to attend to the many implications of current scientific research.”). 
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that legal judgments tainted by implicit biases have detrimental effects on 
the administration of justice.  “Because unconscious bias has the potential 
to undermine the fairness of legal proceedings, efforts to minimize the 
effects of unconscious bias within the participants to such proceedings is a 
desirable goal toward furthering fundamental fairness.”24 
II.     IMPLICIT BIASES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ATTORNEYS’     
DECISION-MAKING 
A. Brief Overview of Cognitive Science Research 
Although lawyers may consider reason and logic as the driving force 
behind their behavior, judgments are often based on implicit biases, which 
act “as a lens through which we view the world. . . .  [They] automatically 
filter[] how we take in and act on information.”25  Scientists who study 
human reasoning agree that it occurs via a “dual process” cognitive 
system.26  “System I is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone; System II is more 
deliberative, calculative, slower, and is often more likely to be error-
free.”27  System I mental processes affect social judgments such as whom 
we favor,28 but they operate without conscious awareness or intentional 
control.29  Implicit biases are automatic, unconscious mental processes 
based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes that are formed by one’s 
life experiences and lurk beneath the surface of the conscious.30  System I 
processes elucidate our implicit biases.31  Implicit biases are rooted in the 
basic way in which humans understand the complex flood of information 
 
24. Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1582 (2013). 
25. Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, at 
16, 17, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit% 
20Bias_0.pdf. 
26. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 974 
(2006). 
27. Id. 
28. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2010). 
29. Id.; see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (explaining that implicit cognition represents the 
unconscious, or unintentional control over “social perception, impression formation, and judgment” 
motivating people’s actions). 
30. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006). 
31. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 
975 (2006) (“[T]he problem of implicit bias is best understood in light of existing analyses of System 
I processes.”). 
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from the world.32  Cognitive structures, called schemas,33 are “mental 
blueprints” that allow an individual to understand new people, 
circumstances, objects, and their relationships to each other, by using an 
existing framework of stored knowledge based on prior experiences.34 
Schemas are cognitive shortcuts allowing us to comprehend “new 
situations and ideas without having to interpret and construct a diagram of 
inferences and relationships for the first time.”35  When we see or think of 
a concept, the schema is activated unconsciously.36  The schema brings to 
mind other information that we associate with the original concept.37  Put 
another way, these mental blueprints sort “our experiences and acquired 
knowledge” and organize them into categories that function like 
containers.38  “[S]chemas influence every feature of human cognition, 
affecting not only what information receives attention, but also how that 
information is categorized, what inferences are drawn from it, and what is 
or is not remembered.”39  We automatically infer character from behavior, 
“experience affective reactions to a variety of objects,” and behave in 
 
32. See id. (stating that implicit bias is “largely automatic” and that because it occurs so rapidly, 
often there is no time for consideration or correction). 
33. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2005) (defining a 
schema as a “cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, 
including its attributes and the relations among those attributes” (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE & 
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98 (2d ed. 1991))). 
34. Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700 
(1994). 
35. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009). 
36. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 303 (1999) (“[A] wide 
range of our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can be triggered automatically by particular 
conflagrations of cues, without any intention or awareness on our part.”). 
37. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (2008) 
(providing an example of a schema that “fancy restaurants in suburbs are likely to be a site of 
discrimination against black customers,” which would be “informed by specific knowledge of the 
long history of anti[-]black discrimination in restaurants” (footnote omitted)); Richard K. Sherwin, 
The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 700 (1994) (“Consider, for example, 
the schema that applies to the following situation: John went to a party.  The next morning he woke up 
with a headache.  Now it is common knowledge that people drink too much at parties and wake up 
the next day feeling hungover.  The situation described leaves out the explanation.  But we have no 
trouble supplying it.  There is a schema in our head that quickly comes to mind to provide that 
explanation.”). 
38. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009). 
39. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on 
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1131 (2004). 
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accordance with traits prompted by recent experiences.40  For example, if 
an individual is introduced as a professor, a “professor schema” may be 
activated and we might associate this person with wisdom, authority, or 
past experiences with a professor.  In this way, we can understand how 
stereotypes are formed—they are developed from our experiences and the 
associations our minds make between concepts, such as social groups, and 
certain attributes.41 
People create different event schemas, or scripts, which help them to 
understand how a process, or event, occurs.42  Because individual 
experiences create schemas, the way each person perceives a particular 
situation may be different.43  When an individual’s cognitive mind 
unconsciously selects a script to interpret a situation, that individual’s 
judgments “will be based on the assumptions derived from” the social 
knowledge embedded in the script, rather than on the unique 
characteristics of the particular situation.44  Scripts not only function as 
cognitive shortcuts that provide meaning to a set of events, but they also 
reinforce traditional cultural and societal values.45  For example, in a study 
 
40. ZIVA KUNDA, MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE, SOCIAL COGNITION 303 (1999). 
41. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 741 (1995) (“Stereotypes consist of well-learned sets of 
associations among groups and traits established in children’s memories at an early age, before they 
have the cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal acceptability of the stereotypes.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
42. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on 
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2004) (“Scripts are in some ways like 
recipes—helping us interpret both the things we see and the things we do not see.  If we observe a 
person paying a bill and leaving a restaurant, a restaurant script triggers knowledge of earlier events 
that have happened: The customer has ordered, been served, and eaten food.”). 
43. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118–19 
(2008) (explaining how white and black observers perceived differently a scenario in which an 
African-American family is seated near the back of the restaurant and for ten minutes, the parents 
attempt to get the waiter’s attention to ask for menus and order food).  Professor Robinson predicts 
that white participants would likely state they did not consider that the placement of the family’s 
table might have a racial correlation, while black observers might fill in the informational gaps with 
the assistance of a schema, such as, “fancy restaurants in suburbs are likely to be a site of 
discrimination against black customers.”  Id. 
44. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 299 (2009); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
997, 1006 (2006) (“In discrimination cases, as elsewhere, judges are constantly using ‘intuitive’ or 
‘common sense’ psychological theories in the construction and justification of legal doctrines and in 
their application to specific legal disputes.”). 
45. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1132 (2004) (“[O]ne of the key 
findings of social cognition literature is that the absence of clear concepts and categories increases the 
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conducted by the Heldrich Center for Workplace Development at Rutgers 
University, “[h]alf of the African-American respondents said that ‘African-
Americans are treated unfairly in the workplace,’ while just 10% of white 
respondents agreed with that statement.  Thirteen percent of nonblack 
people of color shared this perception.”46  There is also evidence from 
polls, while mixed, suggesting that men and women perceive 
discrimination differently.47  For example, in a recent Pew Research 
survey, 75% of Millennial women said that more changes are necessary to 
attain gender parity in the workplace; only 57% of Millennial men 
agreed.48 
Although relying on schemas, such as stereotypes, is cognitively efficient, 
“the price we pay for such efficiency is bias in our perceptions and 
judgments.”49  It is extremely difficult for the individual to deviate from 
what the script has taught her about the world because the outcome 
suggested by the script will seem to be a natural result of precedent 
events.50  Stereotypes are resistant to change because perceptions become 
impervious to new information.51  People give more consideration to 
information that is consonant with a stereotype and give less credence to 
information that is stereotype-inconsistent; they not only seek out 
information that is consistent with the stereotype, but also better 
 
cognitive energies required to process information and thus deters individuals from learning new 
ideas or processing new information.”). 
46. Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2008) 
(quoting K.A. DIXON, DUKE STOREN & CARL E. VAN HORN, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR 
WORKPLACE DEV., RUTGERS UNIV., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW 
DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 8 (2002), available at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/ 
sites/default/files/content/A_Workplace_Divided.pdf.). 
47. See, e.g., id. at 1113 (highlighting data that suggests men and women perceive 
discrimination, particularly sexual harassment, differently). 
48. On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity—For Now, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennial-
women-near-parity-for-now/. 
49. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (citing RICHARD E. 
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT 113–38 (1980)). 
50. Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 265 (2009); see also Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15 
(1984) (“Man inadvertently reveals certain judgmental tendencies in coping with the world.  
Whenever he responds, Man depends on what first comes to mind, on what is available.  He judges 
frequency, probability, and causality on the basis of the most easily generated information.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
51. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (citing RICHARD E. 
NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT 113–38 (1980)). 
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remember stereotype-consistent information.52  “[W]e see what we expect 
to see.  Like well-accepted theories that guide our interpretation of data, 
schemas incline us to interpret data consistent with our biases.”53 
In the 1990s, Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald, and their 
colleagues developed the Implicit Associations Test (IAT) and have since 
been using the test to conduct social cognition research on implicit racial 
bias.54  The IAT pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an 
evaluative dimension (good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and 
speed indicate implicit and automatic attitudes and stereotypes.55  For 
example, in one task, participants are told to quickly pair together pictures 
of African-American faces with positive words from the evaluative 
dimension.56  The strength of the attitude or stereotype is determined by 
the speed at which the participant pairs the words.57  The results from 
hundreds of thousands of IATs taken on the IAT project’s website expose 
systematic implicit racial biases.58 
There is a trove of evidence suggesting that implicit biases, measured by 
the IAT, can affect interaction with others59 and can predict 
discriminatory behavior in the real world.60  For example, an experiment 
 
52. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, U. CIN. L. 
REV. 97, 143 (2010) (“Just as one tends to seek out information that confirms one’s expectations, one 
also tends to better remember expectation-consistent information.” (footnote omitted)). 
53. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1515 (2005) (footnote 
omitted) (citing EDWARD E. SAMPSON, DEALING WITH DIFFERENCES: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 121–22 (1999)). 
54. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. 
McGhee, & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998). 
55. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 355 (2007) (citing Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be 
Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 
123 (Henry L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 2001)). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Clear evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit bias comes from Project Implicit, a research 
website operated by research scientists, technicians, and laboratories at Harvard University, 
Washington University, and the University of Virginia.  About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
http://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
59. JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4 
(2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/ 
PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 954 (2006) (“[M]any 
studies that have used an IAT attitude measure have also included a measure of one or more social 
behaviors that are theoretically expected to be related to attitude or stereotype measures.”). 
60. See JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4 
7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:15 AM 
2014] Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias 289 
featuring doctors making patient assessments provides an example of 
discriminatory behavior predicted by implicit bias measures.61  “Physicians 
with stronger implicit anti-black attitudes and stereotypes” were not as 
likely to prescribe a medical procedure for African-Americans compared to 
white Americans with the same medical profiles.62  In addition, implicit 
measures are relatively better predictors of “spontaneous behaviors such as 
eye contact, seating distance, and other such actions that communicate 
social warmth or discomfort.”63  When interacting with a member of a 
stigmatized group, a person with a more resilient adverse attitude toward 
that particular group tends to display more negative behaviors, such as 
blinking, and fewer positive behaviors, like smiling.64  Significantly, 
implicit biases cause a person to interpret identical actions by people of 
various racial and ethnic groups differently, depending on one’s own group 
membership.65  For example, people with higher implicit bias towards 
 
(2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/ 
PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.pdf (“There is increasing evidence that implicit biases, 
as measured by the IAT, do predict behavior in the real world—in ways that can have real effects on 
real lives.”); Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007) (noting that implicit bias predicts discriminatory 
behaviors in individuals); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 759 (2001) (revealing that implicit bias 
predicts more negative evaluations of agentic (i.e., confident, aggressive, ambitious) women in certain 
hiring conditions); see also Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence 5 
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007), available at 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp2764.pdf (reporting that implicit bias predicts the rate of callback interviews 
based on an implicit stereotype in Sweden that Arabs are lazy). 
61. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 430 (2007). 
62. Id. 
63. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006); see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing 
Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 640 (2003) 
(explaining that implicit bias predicts how individuals read the friendliness of facial expressions). 
64. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007); see JERRY KANG, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., 
IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 4 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/unit_3_kang.authcheckdam.p
df (“[I]mplicit bias predicts awkward body language[,] which could influence whether folks feel that 
they are being treated fairly or courteously.” (citations omitted)). 
65. See Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007) (showing that “[p]eople with higher implicit bias judged 
ambiguous actions by a black or Turkish target more negatively” than ambiguous actions by a white 
target (citations omitted)); see also Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit 
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
REL. 133, 134 (2002) (reviewing research that shows implicit bias predicts more negative evaluations 
of ambiguous actions by an African-American). 
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certain groups judged ambiguous actions and facial expressions by 
members of that group more negatively.66  These manifestations of 
implicit bias, even among people who strive to be impartial, can 
significantly impact an attorney’s ability to effectively represent clients.67 
B. Reducing the Effects of Implicit Bias in Client Representation 
Cognitive science teaches us that our own experience is the unconscious 
starting point for decision-making and provides a lens through which we 
understand others.68  Although reliance on ingrained schemas is difficult 
to overcome, implicit biases caused by categories and schemas may be 
mitigated, or even eliminated,69 by first recognizing that race, gender, 
sexual orientation, and other social categories may be influencing decision-
making; in doing so we rely “less mindlessly on a given schema and 
scrutinize[] more thoroughly the available data.”70  Research shows that 
“[t]he path from implicit bias to negative behavior does not appear 
immutable.”71  Awareness of implicit biases and motivation to act in a 
non-prejudiced manner are critical to mitigating the effects of implicit bias 
on behavior.72 
“Current models of prejudice and stereotype reduction argue that 
prejudice-free responses require perceivers to be aware of their biases; to be 
motivated to change their responses because of personal values, feelings of 
guilt, compunction, or self-insight; and to possess cognitive resources 
necessary to develop and practice correction strategies.”73  Experiments 
 
66. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007). 
67. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 411 (2002) (“Those biases will have a substantial effect on our work if we do 
not confront them.”). 
68. Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, at 
16, 17, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit 
%20Bias_0.pdf; see also Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and 
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 408 (2002) (“[A]s a professional you need to explore and confront 
your own cultural influences and the extent of your unconscious (or conscious) biases, including your 
own racism, sexism, and homophobia.”). 
69. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures 
on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1229 (2004) (suggesting that biases and reliance 
on schemas may be eliminated). 
70. Id. 
71. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 437 (2007). 
72. Id.; see also Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 
U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 143–44 (2010) (agreeing that it is possible to control “the effects of automatic 
stereotypes”). 
73. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: 
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conducted by Irene Blair and Mahzarin Banaji revealed that, while 
stereotype activation is an automatic process, people can control or 
eliminate the effect of stereotypes on their judgments if they have the 
intention to do so and their cognitive resources are not over-constrained.74  
Reliance on implicit biases is thus mitigated through creative analysis,75 
which includes the “creation of new categories, openness to new 
information, and awareness of more than one perspective.”76 
A growing body of research provides evidence that perspective-taking, or 
imagining oneself in the shoes of someone from a different social or ethnic 
group, is a cognitive strategy that can reduce stereotyping.77  To 
successfully perform this “particular feat of mental gymnastics,” a person 
must actively consider another person’s mental state and then try to 
experience or infer the other person’s perceptions.78  Recent experiments 
using various interventions to make participants engage in more 
perspective-taking have demonstrated that actively contemplating others’ 
psychological experiences weakens the “automatic expression of racial 
biases.”79  For example, in one experiment, before viewing a five-minute 
video of a black man being treated worse than an identically situated white 
man, participants were asked to imagine “what they might be thinking, 
feeling, and experiencing if they were Glen [the black man], looking at the 
 
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001) (citations omitted). 
74. Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype 
Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1159 (1996). 
75. See Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. TODAY, Summer 2009, 
at 16, 19, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/The%20Lens%20of%20Implicit 
%20Bias_0.pdf (“Mindfulness is a concept drawn from the cognitive behavioral therapies that 
encourage being in the moment, understanding your thought processes, developing awareness, and 
challenging thinking errors.”). 
76. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on 
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1235 (2004) (quoting ELLEN LANGER, 
MINDFULNESS 61–79 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing 
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 708, 722 (2000) (concluding that perspective-taking can diminish an individual’s 
application of stereotypes). 
78. See Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ Shoes, 
in HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 295, 297 (Keith D. Markman et al. 
eds., 2009) (“[T]here is no more immediate barrier to accurate perspective[-]taking than failing to use 
it in the first place.”). 
79. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1027 (2011); see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, 
Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1103, 1233 (2011) (detailing psychological research that suggests ways to reduce the effects of 
cognitive biases). 
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world through his eyes and walking in his shoes as he goes through the 
various activities depicted in the documentary.”80  The control group was 
told to “remain objective and emotionally detached.”81  In other 
variations, requiring participants to write an essay imagining a day in the 
life of a young black male triggered perspective-taking.82  These 
perspective-taking activities substantially decreased implicit bias as 
measured by the IAT and behavioral changes.83  For example, the 
researchers found that those in the perspective-taking condition chose to 
sit closer to a black interviewer,84 and black experimenters rated their 
interaction with white participants put in the perspective-taking condition 
more positively.85 
As discussed below, understanding how judgments are susceptible to the 
influence of implicit bias and being motivated to control the effects of 
biases are critical to effective and ethical client representation. 
C. Advocacy and Decision-making: Understanding the Impact of Implicit 
 Bias 
An attorney has ethical obligations as “a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the quality of justice.”86  As one who is obligated to “seek 
improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of 
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession,”87 an 
attorney should be concerned about the influence of implicit biases on her 
 
80. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011); see also Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. 
Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group 
Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 721 (2000) (reporting that perspective-taking 
decreases “the accessibility and application of stereotypes”). 
81. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011). 
82. Id. at 1031. 
83. Id. at 1035; see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social 
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002) (showing that people may not be able to do much 
about the automatic activation of stereotypes, but they can behave “in substantially nonprejudiced 
ways” if properly motivated); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 963–65 (2006) (“Implicit biases are malleable.”); 
Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 438 (2007) (“Conscious exertion to be unbiased may—at least temporarily—
reduce implicit bias.”). 
84. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1035 (2011). 
85. Id. at 1037. 
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1) (2011). 
87. Id. at pmbl (6). 
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own judgment and in legal decision-making.88  As the ABA’s Task Force 
on Implicit Bias has stated, “[U]nderstanding implicit bias and ways to 
debias one’s approach to law-related issues and decisions is critical to a fair 
and representative perception and reality of access to justice and equity.”89  
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from 
exhibiting bias or prejudice “based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, . . . when such 
actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.”90  Thus, 
understanding one’s own implicit biases is also critical for ethical and 
effective client representation.91  To do so requires the attorney to explore 
and acknowledge her own implicit biases resulting from cultural and 
societal influences, which may manifest as unconscious racism, sexism, 
ageism, or homophobia.92 
These implicit biases can influence an attorney’s interactions with a 
client from the first meeting and interview.93  As experienced attorneys 
 
88. See What Is Implicit or Unconscious Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias/what-is-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) 
(highlighting the problems created by implicit biases, particularly in the legal profession); cf. Carolyn 
Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 329, 330 (2006) 
(expressing concern that lawyers do not hear their clients’ stories, thus hindering effective 
representation); Linda F. Smith, Always Judged—Case Study of an Interview Using Conversation 
Analysis, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 423, 441 (2009) (“Ethnographic studies that have considered attorney-
client conversations focus on the relationship that the attorney and client develop and the degree to 
which the attorney comes to understand the client’s perspective.  These studies have been largely 
critical of the attorneys, noting their substantial failure to understand or honor the clients’ views.”). 
89. What Is Implicit or Unconscious Bias, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias/what-is-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2011); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 
1578 (2013) (reiterating that ethical rules preclude lawyers from discriminatory manifestations). 
91. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 407–08 (2002) (advocating that attorneys examine and confront their own 
implicit biases). 
92. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 769 (2004) (noting the potential 
for implicit bias to negatively affect the attorney-client relationship, and urging lawyers to 
acknowledge those biases in order to work toward overcoming them); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing 
and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 415–16 (2002) 
(calling for lawyers to “confront their own cultural identity, including the biases and prejudices that 
accompany that identity”). 
93. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 769 (2004) (“You may feel that 
you could never possibly understand your client because the two of you differ so much in terms of 
gender, race, class, culture, religion, sexual orientation, or citizenship status or other factors.”); Paul 
R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 
373, 408 (2002) (describing how implicit biases can be detrimental to effective representation of 
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understand, establishing rapport and gaining trust are critical to effective 
client representation.94  A lawyer must gain the client’s trust and 
confidence to understand the client’s goals and objectives.95  Psychological 
research demonstrates that people usually remember and reveal more 
information when they feel at ease, and they may be more willing to accept 
professional advice when they trust their advisor.96  Certain behaviors, 
such as leaning forward when speaking to a person, not crossing one’s 
arms, smiling, and nodding have been shown to help establish rapport.97  
However, implicit biases can impede an attorney’s ability to establish 
rapport because an attorney who harbors implicit biases about a particular 
group may exhibit negative behaviors, such as unevenness in eye contact, 
leaning back, or looking down while taking notes.98  When interviewing a 
client who is a member of a stigmatized group, an attorney unaware of her 
implicit biases and their effects could unconsciously send signals of distrust 
or disinterest to the client with her tone of voice, demeanor, eye contact, 
facial expressions, and body language.99 
Attorneys can establish rapport during client interviews by allowing 
clients to describe their situation in their own words without interruptions, 
engaging in “active listening,” and showing empathy by acknowledging the 
 
clients); cf. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 442 (2007) (analyzing court opinions that recognize “implicit bias 
may affect the perceptions of participants in the legal system”). 
94. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 442 (2008); see 
also Linda F. Smith, Was It Good for You Too?  Conversation Analysis of Two Interviews, 96 KY. L.J. 
579, 643–47 (2008) (encouraging attorneys to allow the client “substantial opportunity to talk” in 
order to establish rapport).  See generally Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality 
in Lawyer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755 (2004) 
(providing practitioners with tips and guidelines for establishing a good lawyer-client relationship). 
95. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 
499 (2008) (“Trust is central to the attorney-client relationship.”). 
96. Id. at 503. 
97. Id.; see also Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client 
Relationships: Dialogue and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 762 (2004) (explaining how to 
convey “empathy, sympathy, approval and support,” and stressing their efficacy in good lawyer-client 
communication). 
98. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006) (asserting that implicit biases can predict 
“spontaneous behaviors” like eye contact and seating distance); Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007) 
(“Nonverbal behaviors such as facial expressions, eye contact, and body posture have been shown to 
leak implicit attitudes.”). 
99. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 436 (2007). 
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client’s feelings.100  Because a client’s background and facts may be 
completely different from any situation an attorney has experienced 
personally, it is important for the attorney to listen attentively to absorb 
and appreciate the client’s specific circumstances, feelings, and goals.101  
As the research described in the previous section suggests, perspective-
taking can mitigate the effects of implicit bias.102  Effective lawyers 
already understand the importance of perspective-taking when 
representing clients.103  Professor Menkel-Meadow emphasizes that 
“lawyers need to learn to experience ‘the other’ from the values that the 
other holds, not those of the lawyer—this is the challenge of most lawyer–
client relations and lawyer–opposing side relations.”104  Professor Grose 
has likewise stated, “Being a lawyer is about representing people: asking 
questions that elicit stories that we can hear and understand and retell.  To 
be able to ask those questions and hear and retell those stories, we must 
learn to understand human motivation that is different from our own.”105  
To understand the experiences, behaviors, and feelings of others as they 
experience them requires lawyers to put aside their own biases, prejudices, 
and points of view.106 
Attorneys have a duty to “act with reasonable diligence.”107  This 
means that a lawyer must “act with commitment and dedication to the 
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf.”108  In order to represent a client’s interest diligently, an attorney 
must first understand the client’s goals and motives.109  Implicit biases 
 
100. Linda F. Smith, Always Judged—Case Study of an Interview Using Conversation Analysis, 16 
CLINICAL L. REV. 423, 441 (2010); Linda F. Smith, Was It Good for You Too?  Conversation Analysis 
of Two Interviews, 96 KY. L.J. 579, 579–80 (2008). 
101. Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client Relationships: 
Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 763 (2004). 
102. See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial 
Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011) (recounting an experiment in 
which perspective-taking reduced the effect of implicit bias). 
103. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing 
from the MacCrate Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 
620 (1994) (“[T]he good lawyer needs to understand, from a human point of view, what the other 
wants to happen in the world . . . .”). 
104. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . . and Beyond: Some Thoughts on “Outsider 
Narrative” in a Law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 126 (1997). 
106. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 
543 (2008) (“[A]ttorneys need to be aware of the use of such heuristics in their own thinking.”). 
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011). 
108. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
109. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
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may interfere with an attorney’s ability to comprehend and represent a 
client’s story.110  Attorneys may be implicitly biased by the appearance of 
their clients, their race, religion, or age, which could lead to incorrect 
presumptions and judgments.111  For example, an attorney may assume 
that an untidy woman is an unfit parent, or that a disabled person should 
be identified as a victim.112  Assumptions and implicit biases may prevent 
an attorney from learning all information potentially advantageous to 
understanding her client’s goals and experiences.113  These biases will 
operate to categorize clients and their cases based on experiences with other 
clients or assumptions about them.114  When interviewing a client, an 
attorney may be inclined to ask narrowly tailored questions that confirm, 
rather than challenge, those assumptions.115  Recognizing the tendency 
for implicit biases to affect one’s judgments about people can help an 
attorney make efforts to ask questions that will take him beyond these 
stereotypes.116 
Ignoring the influence of implicit bias will lead an attorney to risk 
misunderstanding her clients.117  This misunderstanding may cause 
frustration (“My client just isn’t making any sense!”),118 and perhaps more 
significantly, failure to achieve the client’s objectives.119  Our assumptions 
and implicit biases about who people are, their behavior, and their needs, 
among other characteristics, can impair our ability to understand the actual 
 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 497 (2008) 
(“They may feel a wide variety of emotions relating to their situation—including anger, guilt, 
embarrassment, or fear—and may be interested in pursuing a wide variety of goals.”). 
110. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and 
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 408 (2002) (“[A]s a professional you need to explore and confront 
your own cultural influences and the extent of your unconscious (or conscious) biases . . . .”). 
111. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 459 (2008). 
112. See, e.g., Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights 
Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 252 (2001) (pointing out potential issues that may arise as a 
result of stereotypes in a lawyer–client relationship where the client is disabled). 
113. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 459–60 
(2008). 
114. See id. at 530 (“[D]ecisionmaking is often influenced by such previous investments.”). 
115. Id. at 455–56. 
116. See id. at 456 (“[I]t is also possible that lawyers could use their experiences to construct 
and pursue alternative hypotheses that broaden the inquiry.”). 
117. Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 412 (2002). 
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119. Id. 
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person before us.120  Professor Grose has asserted that attorneys must 
“engage in critical reflection” to recognize the assumptions through which 
we filter all information, such as how we define and classify individuals 
who seek out our legal advice.121  Reflecting upon the influence of 
implicit biases will lead an attorney to question why connecting with or 
understanding the client is difficult.122  Understanding the role of implicit 
biases in coloring perceptions can help an attorney appreciate a client’s 
story that appears to make little sense or a client’s decision to pursue what 
appears to be an ill-conceived strategy, which “might be perfectly 
reasonable with another’s lens and another’s bundle of preferences and 
values.”123  Additionally, recognizing the distorting effects of implicit 
biases on another person’s stories and experiences can help an attorney be 
less judgmental about her clients’ values and decisions.124 
Lawyering also requires the exercise of judgment regarding a client’s 
available choices.125  According to Model Rule 2.1, “[i]n representing a 
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to 
law but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social[,] and 
political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”126  An 
attorney’s implicit biases and other schemas will affect how she 
understands her client and may determine the advice she provides to the 
client.127  For example, schemas may cause the attorney to make incorrect 
 
120. Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 
329, 358–59 (2006). 
121. Id. at 359. 
122. Id. 
123. Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 412 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
124. Id. 
125. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 531 (2008) 
(explaining that an attorney must “do her best to describe client options in an evenhanded manner”). 
126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011). 
127. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1578 (2013) (positing that unconscious bias can affect interaction with 
clients); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 452 (2008) 
(“[P]reconceptions can be important to interpreting data and therefore can strongly influence all 
other tasks that depend on this most basic inferential undertaking.” (quoting RICHARD E. NISBETT 
& LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 67 
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 430 (2007) (reporting that 
physicians with stronger anti-black implicit attitudes were not as likely to prescribe certain 
medications to black patients than similarly situated white patients). 
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assumptions about the clients’ goals.128  Although an attorney’s primary 
objective in resolving a dispute may be to maximize his monetary recovery, 
his client may be more concerned with repairing a relationship, obtaining 
an apology, or dealing with the emotions, such as guilt, embarrassment, or 
fear, triggered by the situation.129  Understanding how these initial 
schemas can influence perception may allow the attorney to realize that the 
client is concerned primarily with non-monetary issues, and that the 
client’s dispute might be better resolved through courses of action other 
than litigation.130  As Rule 2.1 indicates, an attorney should consider 
relevant moral, economic, and social considerations when advising a 
client.131  Determining whether these considerations are relevant may 
require an attorney to move beyond her schemas.132 
An attorney must not only comprehend her client’s story, but must then 
“stand in the shoes” of the client when she communicates the client’s 
experiences, goals, and aspirations to a legal audience.133  As storytellers, 
lawyers weigh factors such as the law, the audience, and the client’s goals to 
craft the story.134  They must distill facts and decide which ones are 
 
128. See Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 361 (2007) (discussing a study which determined that 
plaintiffs’ litigation objectives “rarely correlated with what legal actors perceived as their prime 
litigation aims”); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good 
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 
453 (2008) (commenting that lawyers’ schemas may make them focus more on monetary recovery as 
a measure of success in litigation, rather than the client’s particular needs or goals). 
129. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 497 (2008); see 
also Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 
6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 260 (2000) (claiming that the lawyer–client relationship will “be enhanced 
by the lawyer’s recognition and resolution of strong emotional reactions—positive or negative—
towards a client” and, conversely, “a lawyer’s inability to come to terms with such emotions” affect 
the representation). 
130. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008). 
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011); see also Jean R. Sternlight & 
Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and 
Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008) (urging lawyers to consider 
“non-legal issues” as part of “the ethical practice of law”). 
132. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: 
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 436, 453 (2008). 
133. See id. at 491 (“[T]he relevant psychology suggests that the empathetic lawyer can . . . 
learn more from and provide more information to his client, as well as build better rapport and 
trust.”). 
134. Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from Clinic to 
the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 44 (2010). 
7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:15 AM 
2014] Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias 299 
significant.135  In writing the story for the court, the lawyer chooses each 
word and how to tell the story.136  By “pick[ing] and choos[ing] from 
available facts to present a picture of what happened,”137 a story told by a 
lawyer reflects what matters to her.138  Each element of the story is the 
product of conscious and unconscious choices made by the storyteller.139  
Thus, an attorney’s own experiences, biases, and values can affect her 
ability to convey the client’s story.140  Because a lawyer exercises her 
discretion when creating and conveying a compelling story, it is critical 
that she understands the influence of her own values or judgment. 
Implicit biases play a role in the attorney’s interactions with a client, her 
ability to understand and appreciate the client’s situation and objectives, 
and her ability to accurately represent her client’s story to a legal 
audience.141  An attorney also must understand the impact of implicit 
biases on the listener of a client’s story (the judge for purposes of this 
Article).142  This discussion will follow a brief overview of judicial 
decision-making research. 
III.     INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
A. Brief Overview of Judicial Decision-making Research 
“[J]udges’ early lives, their experiences both on and off the bench, and 
their professional careers instill in them certain ideas, beliefs and attitudes 
about issues and people . . . .”143  Although most judges believe they are 
objective and able to avoid the influence of biases,144 recent studies have 
demonstrated that even the most qualified judges may rely on intuitive 
 
135. Id. at 44–45. 
136. Id. at 44. 
137. Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2421 (1988)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 41. 
140. Id. at 44. 
141. See id. (discussing how an attorney’s weighing of the substance of a case—including 
factual elements, legal factors, and a client’s goals—can affect how the attorney tells the client’s story 
and how the audience interprets the same story). 
142. See id. at 44–46 (“Lawyers should use [context] clues to help guide their ongoing pursuit 
of the client’s narrative and to work with the client to construct a story that will engage the 
decisionmaker’s curiosity and compassion without triggering his disbelief or dismissal.”). 
143. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1994). 
144. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (reporting that 97% of judges in an educational program rated 
themselves in the top half of the judges attending the program “in their ability to avoid racial 
prejudice in decision[-]making”). 
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thought processes, resulting in judgment that is flawed with systemic 
errors.145  Judges, like everyone, are the result of their race,146 ethnic 
background, nationality, socioeconomic situation,147 gender,148 sexual 
orientation, religion, and ideology.149  “Ideally, judges reach their 
decisions utilizing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria, 
while putting aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other 
individuating factors.”150  However, this ideal does not coincide with the 
findings of behavioral scientists, whose research has shown that the human 
mind is a complex mechanism; regardless of conscious or avowed biases 
and prejudices, most people, no matter how well-educated or personally 
committed to impartiality, harbor some implicit biases.151  As Judge 
Posner explains, using intuition is inevitable and “compelled by the 
institutional structure of adjudication.”152  Judges make hundreds, if not 
thousands, of judicial decisions in the course of a year, and they have not 
the time, before or after casting votes, to engage in “elaborate analytical 
 
145. See Nicole Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 
AKRON L. REV. 29–33 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (discussing studies of judicial decision-making and the influence of 
implicit biases). 
146. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of 
Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1161–63 (2009) (finding that black judges and 
white judges perceive racial harassment differently, which means that the decision-making process is 
not completely objective; judges bring their personal experiences, or lack of experience, to bear when 
deciding cases). 
147. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
137, 141 (2013) (“Because judges are more economically privileged than the average individual 
litigant appearing before them, they may be unaware of the gaps between their own experiences and 
realities and those of poor people.  These gaps have contributed to patterns of judicial decision-
making that appear to be biased against poor people as compared to others.”). 
148. Neil A. Lewis, Debate on Whether Female Judges Decide Cases Differently, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 2009, at A16 (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s arguments in a Supreme Court case involving the 
appropriateness of the strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl by school authorities).  Justice Ginsberg’s 
experience as a female may have influenced her interpretation of the issues and brought a new 
perspective that would not have been expressed in her absence.  Id.; see also Nicole Negowetti, Judicial 
Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, AKRON L. REV. 5–6 (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164325 (reviewing the factors 
influencing judges intuitive thought processes and decisions). 
149. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
706 (2013) (warning that judges have their own biases). 
150. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
151. See id. at 5 (commenting that a judge’s blind faith in her impartiality may create “a false 
sense of confidence” in her decisions, which may cause her to “fail to take into account the 
unavoidable influences we all experience as human beings”). 
152. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008). 
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procedures.”153  The conditions under which judges must make decisions 
inevitably lead to reliance on intuitive thinking that can lead to “illusions 
of judgment.”154  Given the severe time constraints at every stage of the 
decision-making process, “the judge’s reasoning process is primarily 
intuitive.”155  Judgments based upon intuition, personal background, or 
previous experiences can be unreliable grounds for judicial decision-
making156 because of the likelihood that implicit biases will influence the 
decision.157 
As explained in the previous section, an attorney’s primary role is to 
effectively present a client’s story, so that it is heard and accepted by the 
decisionmaker.158  When crafting a client’s story, an attorney must realize 
that it will be understood through the stories already existing in the mind 
of the judge.159  These “background” or “stock” stories based on one’s 
past experiences are stereotypes about what it means to be an employee, a 
parent, etc.160  “When a listener can identify a stock story sufficiently 
similar to his own, he makes a ‘likeness judgment.’”161  To process 
information rapidly and efficiently, the listener compares the facts of the 
 
153. Id. 
154. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 783 (2001) (“[J]udges make decisions under uncertain, time-pressured 
conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions of 
judgment.”). 
155. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008). 
156. See Linda L. Berger, A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch, 18 LEGAL COMM. & 
RHETORIC: J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 18 (2013) (“[J]udicial intuition [is] unreliable 
because judges are unlikely to obtain accurate and reliable feedback on most of the judgments they 
make.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
157. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) 
(“Although the judges displayed less vulnerability to [illusions of judgment] than other experts and 
laypersons . . . under certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically 
erroneous judgments.”). 
158. See, e.g., Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from 
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 46 (2010) (opining that 
attorneys persuade by storytelling); see also Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” 
from the Outside: Using Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. 
& GENDER 61, 77 (2007) (“Stories and storytelling are central components of law and law 
practice.”). 
159. See, e.g., Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” from the Outside: Using 
Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 78 
(2007) (declaring that before telling client stories, an attorney must be aware of “the stories already in 
the minds of the intended audience”). 
160. Id. 
161. Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native 
Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L. 
REV. 457, 464 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
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story with a stock story that he already knows, generally accepting the 
stock story without analyzing it independently.162  The result of this 
information processing in legal decision-making is that the story most 
familiar to the judge is usually the one that prevails.163  Due to the need 
to clear increasingly expanding dockets,164 judges may substitute their 
own stock stories for a litigant’s unfamiliar story, rather than carefully 
process and analyze the new information.165  For example, Professor Neitz 
recently argued that “[b]ecause judges are more economically privileged 
than the average individual litigant appearing before them, they may be 
unaware of the gaps between their own experiences and realities and those 
of poor people.”166  She explained that this class privilege may lead judges 
to assume that all people have comparable experiences.167  “Treating all 
parties as though they were socioeconomically identical rises beyond 
privilege to the level of bias, precisely because judges have a duty to 
consider the unique facts of every case.”168  The experiences of indigent 
litigants may be foreign to judges, thus making judges susceptible to 
socioeconomic bias in their decision-making processes.169 
According to traditional lawyering wisdom, to win a case a lawyer must 




164. See, e.g., Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No 
Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary 
Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 685, 703 (2013) (lamenting that federal judges have tremendous case-loads); see also Diana 
Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native Americans Involved in 
Interpersonal Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 457, 467–68 
(2012) (criticizing the “unrelenting pressure” of judicial economy). 
165. Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for Native 
Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 PHOENIX L. 
REV. 457, 467–68 (2012); see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989) (describing the creation of “stories” to strengthen 
the cohesiveness of the group); Christopher Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice 
and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 866 (1992) (“The story 
telling dilemma in law arises when authoritative discourse and knowledge impede the transfer of the 
storyteller’s meaning and images.  Hence the receiver’s interpretive understanding of the story is often 
at odds with the message intended by the teller.”); Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
3 (1984) (“To solve a problem through persuasion of another, we . . . must understand and 
manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a plausible and compelling story—
one that moves that person to grant the remedy we want.”). 




169. Id. at 148. 
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expectations that the finder of fact has about a person in the client’s 
situation.”170  However, this approach:  
[L]imits possible stories a lawyer can tell on behalf of a disempowered client 
whose experiences, perspectives, and images are absent from the dominant 
legal narratives. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . .  In order to win cases, . . . lawyers must fit their clients’ stories into 
law’s established terms by squeezing client identities, histories, and problems 
into universalized narratives.  The reliance on precedent by both judges and 
lawyers blocks the recognition and understanding of stories told that do not 
fit with past authoritative accounts.171  
Discussing the implications of these issues in detail is beyond the scope 
of this Article, but this narrative theory reveals the danger of implicit 
biases, which may hinder a judge’s ability to understand and properly 
evaluate a litigant’s story.172  Attorneys should understand that although a 
case theory based on the client’s story may sound plausible to the attorney 
and client, a judge may be unable to understand or credit the story because 
it seems unrealistic or improbable from his particular vantage point.173  
Vetting a case theory with colleagues, particularly those of different 
backgrounds, can thus be a valuable tool. 
Armed with this understanding of judicial decision-making, how can an 
attorney argue her clients’ cases in ways that will prevent judges from 
deferring to their implicit biases?  As discussed above, motivation to avoid 
the influence of biases has been shown to mitigate the effects of these 
biases.174  If a judge is unaware of how implicit biases operate or has no 
motivation to avoid these influences, is there anything an advocate can do 
 
170. Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 
UTAH L. REV. 247, 250 (2001). 
171. Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of 
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 872–73 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
172. Many critical scholars have argued “that the law’s constraints make it impossible for 
stories that diverge from the dominant narrative to be heard and recognized.”  Laura L. Rovner, 
Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 277 
(2001). 
173. See, e.g., Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice for 
Native Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5 
PHOENIX L. REV. 457, 467–68 (2012) (discussing problems with stock stories in the context of child 
custody disputes involving Native American litigants).  Jones points out, for example, that “[t]ribal 
member litigants, particularly those raised in or around the reservation community, understand that 
their stock stories are wholly unfamiliar to judges in the dominant culture.”  Id. at 467. 
174. See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial 
Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027, 1030 (2011) (finding that perspective-taking 
reduces the effects of implicit bias). 
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to prevent a judge’s implicit biases from affecting his decision-making?  Is 
she resigned to accept the influence of these biases and hope for an 
outcome not unjustly affected by them?  Unfortunately, “[d]espite the 
threats to impartiality created by implicit bias on the part of judges, 
attorneys, and jurors, protections against it and its effects are few.”175  
Although no studies have yet been conducted to directly answer this 
question, the following discussion identifies several procedural postures 
which are particularly susceptible to the influence of a judge’s implicit 
biases and examines how awareness of these implicit bias pitfalls can 
inform an attorney’s strategies. 
B. From Dispositive Motions to the Appeal: The Influence of Implicit Bias 
Analyzing the standards under which federal district court judges decide 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment reveals the pitfalls 
of implicit bias in judicial decision-making.176  In deciding whether to 
dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),177 a 
district judge must decide whether the pleadings contain “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”178  Thus, a claim is 
facially “plausible” only when a “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.”179  In any civil case in federal court, 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”180  Instead, the plaintiff must 
 
175. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 827, 838 (2012). 
176. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
706–07 (2013) (arguing that implicit biases may contribute to the high number of employment 
discrimination cases that are disposed of via summary judgment). 
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
178. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme 
Court interpreted this language as preventing the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).  In Twombly, the 
majority instead announced that pleadings must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  Two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court 
emphasized that the plausibility standard of Twombly governs the pleading standard “in all civil 
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 
(2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
180. Id. 
7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:15 AM 
2014] Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias 305 
support legal conclusions with “well-pleaded factual allegations,” which 
must be taken as true, if scrutinized, to see whether “they plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.”181  Whether such facts give rise to a 
plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”182  
Judge Nancy Gertner explained the difficulty in applying this test: “What 
is plausible to me, what my common sense indicates, coming from where I 
come from, may not be what is plausible to other judges, what comports 
with their common sense.”183  Stated another way, the differences among 
judges may lead one judge to dismiss a complaint, while another might 
determine that an indistinguishable claim survives, only because of the way 
“each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience and common sense.’”184  
This standard:  
[A]ppeals too much to judicial subjectivity, which inevitably depends (at 
least in part) on an individual judge’s background, values, preferences, 
education, and attitudes . . . .  One does not have to be paranoid to be 
concerned that these highly individualistic considerations are at work and 
impacting a district judge’s thinking on a motion to dismiss . . . .185  
Requiring judges to use their judicial experience and common sense may 
be a license to invoke implicit biases, particularly in employment 
discrimination cases.186  As Professor Kang and his co-authors explained, 
“When we lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely the 
state of affairs at the motion to dismiss stage—we have no choice but to 
 
181. Id. at 679. 
182. Id. 
183. Nancy Gertner, A Judge Hangs Up Her Robes, 38 LITIG. 60, 61 (2012); see Arthur R. 
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 335 (2013). (“Does it mean that . . . we are 
supposed to be comforted by assuming that judicial experience is homogeneous among members of 
the federal bench, or that common sense is generously and equally distributed among them and will 
be applied in a uniform manner?”). 
184. Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (Or More Accurately The Judge) Is Still out for Civil Rights 
and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 724 (2013). 
185. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 336 (2013). 
186. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
706–07 (2013) (arguing that implicit biases may contribute to the high number of employment 
discrimination cases that are disposed of via summary judgment); Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal 
Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 
100 KY. L.J. 235, 238 (2012) (examining the subjective standards promulgated by Iqbal and the 
resulting potential for implicit judicial bias). 
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rely more heavily on our schemas.”187  Thus, deciding whether a claim is 
“plausible” based only on “minimal facts that can be alleged before 
discovery” may not be sufficient “to ground that judgment in much more 
than the judge’s schemas.”188  A recent study of civil rights actions 
involving allegations of employment and housing discrimination supports 
this reason for concern.189  In this study, Professor Brescia found that 
employment and housing discrimination cases are being dismissed at a 
higher rate since Ashcroft v. Iqbal190 announced that the plausibility 
criterion governs pleading standards in all civil actions in the United States 
district courts.191  These findings “may suggest . . . that the subjective 
elements of the plausibility standard, . . . may be creeping into judicial 
decision-making.”192 
Similar arguments have been asserted against the increased granting of 
summary judgment motions.193  Considerable scholarship has criticized 
the summary judgment standard for potentially permitting a judge to 
decide the motion based on his personal, subjective views of the 
evidence.194  Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
 
187. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2012) 
(footnote omitted).  Kang and his co-authors use an example of a Latina plaintiff: “[I]n order to come 
to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile general schemas for Latina workers with 
individualized data about the specific plaintiff.”  Id. 
188. Id. at 1162. 
189. See id. at 1162–63 (echoing various studies that demonstrate increased dismissal rates for 
post-Iqbal federal employment discrimination cases).  Kang and his co-authors recognize that it may 
not be possible to test whether explicit or implicit biases influence how judges decide motions to 
dismiss actual cases.  Id. at 1162.  However, they also point to preliminary data about dismissal rates 
pre and post-Iqbal to support their hypothesis that Iqbal’s plausibility standard poses a risk of 
increasing the impact of implicit biases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage for race-discrimination claims in 
particular.  Id. at 1162–63.  See generally Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New 
Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012) 
(describing a study of judicial decisions in discrimination actions). 
190. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
191. Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 286 (2012). 
192. Id. 
193. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1163–64 
(2012) (claiming that implicit biases at the summary judgment phase may not be as pervasive because 
“more individuating information” will be available to the judge through discovery, but cautioning 
that the judge must still make a judgment call that could be subject to implicit biases). 
194. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 760 (2009) 
(“[T]he terms ‘reasonable jury,’ ‘reasonable juror,’ ‘rational juror,’ ‘rational factfinder,’ and others are 
used interchangeably in decisions regarding dispositive motions, even though the terms are capable of 
significantly different meanings.  This lack of definition makes it more likely that judges decide 
dispositive motions based on their own views of the evidence, as opposed to what a reasonable jury 
could find.” (footnote omitted)); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is 
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 143–48 (2007) (propounding that summary judgment is an 
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summary judgment can only be granted if there is “no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”195  At summary judgment, judges determine whether a reasonable 
jury could find for the defendant.196  In doing so, the judge ultimately sits 
as a juror, deciding if she can rule for the plaintiff.197  In other words, 
“judges decide the motions based on their own individual views of the 
evidence,” and not necessarily on how a reasonable jury would decide.198  
Professor Schneider articulated the problems with the application of the 
reasonable juror standard: “But what if the judge does not realize the 
differences between those views—his or her perspective and those of a 
‘reasonable juror’?  What if a judge does not have the humility, self-
awareness, or insight to recognize the limitations of his or her own 
perspective?”199  Deciding a motion for summary judgment, therefore, 
creates the risk that implicit biases will seep into the judge’s determination 
of “reasonableness.”200 
 
unconstitutional practice because the judge “decides whether the case should be dismissed before a 
jury hears the case”). 
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
196. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (laying out summary 
judgment requirements). 
197. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 719 (2007). 
198. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 761 (2009). 
199. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 766–67 (2007).  Authors Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, 
and Donald Braman make an argument similar to Professor Schneider’s, but they also suggest that 
judges “engage in a sort of mental double check” before making a summary judgment ruling:  
Before concluding . . . that no reasonable juror could find such facts, the judge should try to 
imagine who those potential jurors might be.  If, as will usually be true, she cannot identify 
them, or can conjure only the random faces of imaginary statistical outliers, she should proceed 
to decide the case summarily.  But if instead she can form a concrete picture of the dissenting 
jurors, and they are people who bear recognizable identity-defining characteristics—
demographic, cultural, political, or otherwise—she should stop and think hard.  Due humility 
obliges her to consider whether privileging her own view of the facts risks conveying a 
denigrating and exclusionary message to members of such subcommunities.  If it does, she 
should choose a different path.  
Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 898–99 (2009). 
200. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, 
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and 
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012).  In an opinion denying summary 
judgment in an age discrimination case, Judge Getner wrote “[D]iscrimination is a complex 
phenomenon . . . .  It is about concepts like bias and motivation, precisely the kinds of concepts least 
suited for resolution by a judge.”  Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (footnote omitted).  Judge Getner further explained that she was “troubled by recent 
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The “abuse and overuse” of summary judgment in employment-
discrimination cases, as well as the potential for implicit biases to affect 
decision-making, has been well-documented.201  For instance, results of a 
recent study suggest that a judge’s analysis of an employment-
discrimination case varies based on her race and experiences.202  The study 
revealed that white judges are much more likely to dispense with 
employment-discrimination cases during the summary judgment stage 
than are minority judges, and white judges discard cases that involve 
minority plaintiffs “at a much higher rate than cases involving white 
plaintiffs.”203  Although there are many ways to explain this trend,204 
judges’ implicit biases are at least partly to blame.205  Judge Donald and 
her former law clerk recently wrote, “While judges strive to apply the law 
fairly and impartially, they are human and therefore must view things 
through their own cognitive lenses—judges, like all humans, are not free 
from biases. . . .  [I]mplicit biases nevertheless ‘strongly influence how 
courts decide particular cases especially in the discrimination context.’”206  
Judge Bennett predicts that those judges who would deny any implicit bias 
might in fact be more likely to be influenced by their inevitable biases.207  
 
statistics that suggest that 70% of summary judgment motions in civil rights cases and 73% of 
summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases are granted.”  Id. at 322 n.3. 
201. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2007) (reporting that summary judgment motions are 
granted in 73% of employment discrimination cases, almost always in favor of the defendant); Kerri 
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 112 (2011) 
(“Research confirms everyday observations of how much more difficult it is for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs than for other plaintiffs to survive pre-trial motions to dismiss their cases and 
to win at trial or on appeal” (footnote omitted)). 
202. Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, 
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 346 (2012). 
203. Id. 
204. See, e.g., id. (recognizing the weakness in their methodology and that their data “cannot 
identify what specific information influences” a judge’s summary judgment decision). 
205. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006) (“In 
discrimination law, there already is, and there has long been, an ‘intuitive psychologist behind the 
bench.’” (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of 
Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 835 
(2004))). 
206. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, 
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and 
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 760–61 (2012) (quoting Michael Selmi, Why Are 
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 562 (2001)). 
207. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
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Research has confirmed, “when a person believes himself to be objective, 
such belief licenses him to act on his biases.”208  Judges’ implicit biases 
against employment discrimination plaintiffs may also be attributed to “a 
shift in society’s understanding of discrimination” in that perhaps many 
believe workplace discrimination “is no longer the problem that it was 
when Title VII was enacted.”209  As Judge Bennett framed the question, 
“So, is it any wonder that, with all these factors coming into play, judges 
have increased antipathy to employment discrimination cases, either on an 
overt, conscious level or, more likely, in an implicit, unconscious way?”210 
An appellate court’s decision is also subject to the influences of implicit 
bias.211  Judge Posner has described the process of reviewing cases on 
appeal, explaining that appellate judges read parties’ briefs, talk with their 
law clerks, listen to oral arguments, and immediately after, briefly discuss 
the case with their colleagues, taking a tentative vote that “usually turns 
out to be final.”212  Even though a judicial opinion can serve as a check on 
implicit bias by requiring the judge to explain how she arrived at her 
decision, it is an “imperfect check;” the vote deciding the legal issue is cast 
before the opinion is written and most judges do not see their vote as a 
 
706 (2013). 
208. Id. at 707 (quoting Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s 
True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 208 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
209. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, 
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and 
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 761 (2012).  Professor Trina Jones offers an 
additional explanation for plaintiffs’ lack of success in employment discrimination cases:  
Because [employment discrimination] claims are premised on the continuing presence of racism, 
they are now counter to society’s normative beliefs.  Thus, it is not surprising that they are met 
with suspicion and skepticism.  If judges believe that discrimination is rare and aberrant, then 
they will perceive no need to probe deeply an employer’s justifications, even when those 
justifications are specious and proved false.  Rather, a burden will be placed on plaintiffs to 
come forth with additional proof to counter the colorblind, post[-]racial presumption.  
Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 433–34 (2010). 
210. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
707 (2013) (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal 
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–10 (2007)). 
211. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 129 (2000) (describing the appellate playing field as “unlevel” because 
defendants succeed “significantly more often” on appeal than do plaintiffs).  The authors attribute 
this statistic to the attitudes of appellate judges, who “exhibit a bias in favor of defendants” in order 
to counter a “perceived pro-plaintiff bias” in the trial court.  Id. 
212. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110 (2008). 
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hypothesis that must be proven through further research.213  Rather, the 
research is to find evidence to support the hypothesis.214  The fact that 
appellate decisions are not unanimous suggests that judges evaluate the 
same facts and legal principles using distinct filters shaped by personal 
experience.215 
C. Mitigating the Impact of Implicit Biases in Judicial Decision-making 
The most important lesson from this Article’s discussion of implicit 
biases and their influence on judicial decision-making is that attorneys 
should not presume that judges are capable of evaluating information 
differently than the rest of humanity—they are not immune from the 
influence of implicit biases.216  In light of the cognitive science research 
and an understanding of judicial decision-making standards that are 
susceptible to the influence of implicit bias, the following section makes 
some modest proposals for reducing the influence of these biases. 
Although the psychological research regarding deactivation of 
stereotypes and implicit biases has not been empirically tested in a legal 
setting, some studies in other contexts have demonstrated several ways in 
which the activation of stereotypes may be temporarily inhibited.217  For 
example, because multiple schemas may apply to one person, making 
people focus on only one of those categories “inhibits the activation of 
stereotypes associated with another category.”218  To illustrate, “an Asian 
 
213. Id. 
214. Id.  Searching for support for a pre-determined conclusion is evidence of confirmation 
bias, which is a tendency for a person to search for information that “confirms, rather than 
contradicts one’s initial judgment . . . .”  Id. at 111; see also Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: 
Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2013) (defining confirmation bias by explaining that because people are attached to their 
perceptions, they “seek information that confirms” those perspectives and “resist persuasion to the 
contrary”). 
215. RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW-TO-WIN APPEAL MANUAL: WINNING APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 2 (3d ed. 2012). 
216. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary 
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment 
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 
706 (2013) (insisting that judges are subject to implicit biases).  See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) 
(conducting a study to measure judges’ implicit racial biases and finding, that like most people, 
judges “carry implicit biases concerning race”). 
217. See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to 
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331–32 (2012) (providing 
ways in which stereotypes may be temporarily inhibited). 
218. Id. at 331 (quoting Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive 
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see 
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female mechanic,” would be associated with different schemas for Asian, 
female, and mechanic.219  By emphasizing the mechanic schema, for 
instance, the stereotypes regarding Asians and females may be 
deactivated.220  There is also evidence that role schemas may supersede 
racial or gender schemas because people use their “role” schemas first.221  
Thus, when a person encounters an African-American police officer, for 
example, the “police officer” schema will ostensibly govern the 
interaction.222  In telling a client’s story, effective attorneys understand 
that they should “humanize their clients.”223  Professor Blasi explains that 
doing so “means conveying the multidimensional complexity of human 
beings who may otherwise be understood by reference to one label or 
group.”224  In other words, to preclude a judge from activating racial or 
gender stereotypes, an attorney should highlight the individual and 
complex characteristics of the client.225  Psychological research also shows 
that avoiding the influences of stereotypes in decision-making requires a 
decisionmaker to put forth more effort and time to gathering individuating 
information about the litigant, rather than relying on her triggered 
stereotypes.226  Hence, to weaken the impact of gender stereotypes, 
providing personalized information about a particular woman may 
 
Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1241, 1253 (2002) (reviewing studies that have demonstrated a “rebound effect,” in which the active 
suppression of stereotypes leads to increased stereotyping in the future). 
219. Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize 
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331 (2012). 
220. Id. 
221. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1503 n. 63 (2005) (citing 
SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 143 (2d ed. 1991)). 
222. Id.; Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to 
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 331 (2012). 
223. Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1279 (2002). 
224. Id. 
225. Id.; see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 
9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 286 (2012) (recommending 
that decisionmakers avoid relying on stereotypes by using a “bottom-up model” for constructing 
decisions, rather than beginning with stereotypical predispositions). 
226. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 286 (2012); see also Gary Blasi, 
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1253 
(2002) (remarking that one can control the automatic activation of stereotypes by “devoting time and 
cognitive resources to focusing on individuating information”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2012) (forewarning that during the motion to dismiss 
phase, judges “lack sufficient individuating information,” which leaves them with no other option 
“but to rely more heavily” on their schemas). 
7 NEGOWETTI_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:15 AM 
312 ST. MARY’SJOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:278 
suppress pervasive gender stereotypes.227  When the imparted information 
is “concrete, unambiguous, and explicitly relevant to the judgment at 
hand,” a judge’s reliance on stereotypes dwindles and more credence is 
given to the substantive facts about the individual.228  Applying the 
lessons from these studies, an attorney should recognize the significance of 
conveying to the court a client’s complete story, emphasizing specific and 
individuating facts.229 
It may also be possible to control stereotypes by priming persons with 
ideals of fairness and equality.230  Results of several studies indicate that 
people can cultivate cognitive habits that subdue stereotyping.231  For 
example, people primed using scrambled sentences that included words 
like “helpful” and “friendly”—words associated with cooperation—were 
more predisposed to “cooperate in potentially competitive games.”232  
The results of the study evince that priming people with “fairness or 
egalitarian goals” might prompt subconscious cognitions that could 
potentially abate the consequences of automatic stereotype activation.233  
In light of these findings, to suppress the activation of stereotypes, an 
attorney should present a client’s story in a way that “appeal[s] to the 
judge’s spirit of justice.”234  Judge Fine’s observations also support this 
advice.  Regardless of their personal philosophies and backgrounds, 
 
227. See Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” from the Outside: Using Case 
Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 82 (2007) 
(“Psychological theory holds that individual information concerning a particular woman is believed 
to have an impact on disassembling descriptive stereotypes.” (footnote omitted)). 
228. See id. (quoting Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should 
Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 665, 686 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[P]arties can thwart the stereotypes 
inherent in thinking . . . by presenting specific facts while telling the story from her point of view.”). 
229. Id. 
230. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1253 (2002) (detailing a way in which to work against developing stereotypes); 
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160–62 (2012) (addressing 
tactics for avoiding reliance on schemas by providing information to the decisionmaker proactively). 
231. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1254 (2012). 
232. Id.  In contrast, subjects that were primed with words correlated with achievement—such 
as “win,” or “compete”—were more persistent in their attempts to solve the puzzles, “suggesting that 
the priming had altered their motivational level.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
233. Id. 
234. Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band 
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 983, 983 (2011).  In the appellate context, Professor Lewis posits that appealing to 
the judge’s sense of justice will result in a favorable ruling for the client on appeal: “If the client 
suffered an injustice in the court below, the judge will seek to ‘do justice’ for the client.”  Id. 
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appellate judges desire to do what they consider to be “right.”235  
Although what is “right” is difficult to define without context, Judge Fine 
asserts that in reading an appellate brief, a judge must be “made to see that 
your client deserves to win.”236  A judge may be so persuaded through 
effective storytelling.237  For example, Professor Chestek recommends 
portraying a client as the protagonist of a story and the opposing party as 
an antagonist who is harmful to the client’s interests.238  A client’s story 
should be presented in a compelling and captivating way so as to make the 
court agree with the client’s position.239  Professor Lewis explains, “Once 
immersed in a human drama, the judge looks for the interplay between the 
captivating story and justice.  For the appellate judge is keenly sensitive to 
the possibility that your client was the unwitting victim of an 
injustice.”240  Thus, in priming the judge to focus on goals of justice and 
fairness, an attorney may help suppress the judge’s implicit biases. 
Although the above suggestions are merely theoretical as they apply to 
advocacy, recognition of implicit biases and motivation to control their 
influences has been shown to be successful in reducing the effects of these 
biases on decision-making.241  When judges are aware of the necessity of 
monitoring their own reactions to check for the influence of implicit 
biases, coupled with a motivation to defeat those biases, they seem able to 
overcome them.242  Thus, increasing awareness of the problems with 
 
235. RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW TO WIN APPEAL MANUAL: WINNING APPELLATE 
ARGUMENTS IN A NUTSHELL 14 (3d ed. 2012). 
236. Id.; see also Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL 
WRITING J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 144 (2008) (alleging that if the judge sympathizes with a 
client’s story, she will be more prone to decide in the client’s favor). 
237. See Harry Pregerson & Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, The Seven Virtues of Appellate Brief 
Writing: An Update from the Bench, 38 SW. L. REV. 221, 226 (2008) (intimating that appellate brief 
writers should consider borrowing storytelling techniques from writers in other fields, like journalism, 
and use these techniques “to craft compelling stories that make the reader want to continue reading”). 
238. Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: 
J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 144 (2008); see also Brian L. Porto, Improving Your Appellate Briefs: 
The Best Advice from Bench, Bar, and Academy, VT. B.J., Winter 2011, at 36, 38 (identifying 
complaints from appellate judges about lawyers’ briefs that lack effective storytelling). 
239. See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Improving Your Appellate Briefs: The Best Advice from Bench, Bar, 
and Academy, VT. B.J., Winter 2011, at 36, 38 (advocating narratives to convey the “essence of the 
case”). 
240. Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band 
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 983, 996 (2011). 
241. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (conducting a study on implicit biases harbored by judges and 
concluding that those biases can be suppressed with the proper motivation). 
242. Id. at 1221. 
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implicit bias may be the best solution for reducing the impact of these 
biases in judicial decisions.243  From a practical perspective, attorneys can 
focus the judge’s attention on the legal standards under which a motion or 
brief should be reviewed.244  For example, in arguing against the granting 
of summary judgment, Judge Donald and J. Eric Pardue suggest that 
“[r]eminding judges to liberally interpret the reasonableness of potential 
inferences provides a buffer, however slight, against the tendency to 
substitute their judgment for the jury’s.”245  Because the plausibility 
standard from Iqbal has been applied inconsistently by the lower 
courts,246 a plaintiff opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss may have 
the opportunity propose a standard for plausibility that allows a judge to 
recognize the dangers of implicit bias in making such a determination.  A 
standard, such as one adopted by the Eastern District of Texas247, could 
help judges consider plausibility more liberally, to prevent a judge from 
grounding his decision in his schemas.248  As the magistrate concluded:  
[T]he critical inquiry is whether a plaintiff’s claim is “conceivable” (not 
enough for Rule 12) or “plausible” (sufficient for Rule 12). . . .  The majority 
in Swanson put it this way: “As we understand it, . . . the plaintiff must give 
enough details about the subject matter of the case to present a story that 
holds together.  In other words, the court will ask itself could these things 
 
243. See id. (postulating that a judge’s increased self-awareness of her own implicit biases may 
actually reduce their effects). 
244. See Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band 
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 983, 997 (2011) (pointing out that the standard of review “implicates how you write 
your client’s narrative”). 
245. Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short, 
Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and 
Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 764 (2012). 
246. See Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559, 577 
(2011) (criticizing the Iqbal opinion for imprecisely articulating the new pleading standard which has 
led to its inconsistent application at the trial court level). 
247. Escuadra v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (E.D. Tex. 2010).  
This standard was based on Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, a United States Supreme Court case 
decided in 2007 that involved the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  See generally Tellabs, Inc. 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting the standard for pleadings in a 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act case).  Professor Reinert clarifies the Supreme Court 
opinion: “Specifically, the Court in Tellabs defined ‘plausibility’ for the purposes of the PSLRA 
[Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] as equipoise: that is, if the plaintiff’s theory of relief was ‘at 
least compelling’ as the alternative explanations, the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss 
under the PSLRA.”  Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559, 
583 (2011) (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324). 
248. See Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW 559, 583–84 
(2011) (praising the Eastern District of Texas for conducting “an extensive analysis of the plausibility 
problem”). 
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have happened, not did they happen.”249  
Including information about how implicit bias can affect and taint 
decision-making in a complaint, motion, jury instructions, or brief can call 
attention to the problem.250  Exposure to the implicit bias research may 
help a judge minimize her implicit bias when deciding motions or 
appeals.251  However, an attorney is likely to exercise restraint in doing 
so—naturally, people do not like being accused of hosting biases, even 
unconscious ones.252  Although an attorney should make the judge aware 
of implicit biases, she may not want the judge to interpret the information 
as implying that the judge is biased.253  An effective lawyer challenges the 
judge to move beyond a common schema without accusing the judge of 
bias.254  For instance, when representing a father in a custody bench trial, 
counsel might open with: “Your Honor, although the ‘tender years’ 
doctrine of young children always being awarded to the mother has been 
overturned, it appears to be alive and well in a few cases.  In this case, the 
father is seeking custody based on the following factors.”255  This 
particular method of arguing reminds the judge of a specific bias without 
accusing her of embracing the bias.256 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
Justice Cardozo explained: “Deep below consciousness are other forces, 
the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex 
 
249. Escuadra, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 
404 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
250. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1275 (2002) (noting awareness of prejudice or stereotypes is most often the first 
step to reducing the effects); Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit 
Bias Can Be Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21 available at 
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf (“[A]ll of the research 
seems to indicate that once people are made aware of implicit bias, it disappears.”). 
251. See Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be 
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21 available at 
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf (touting the research of 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and company, reviewing their findings that awareness of implicit bias can reduce 
its effects); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (examining judicial bias according to decisions). 
252. Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be 
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIG. NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 21, available at 
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf. 
253. See id. (addressing the need for caution when addressing race). 
254. Id. 
255. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
256. Id. 
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of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the 
man, whether he be litigant or judge . . . .”257  The implicit biases of 
attorneys and judges pervert the processes and results in both civil and 
criminal litigation, and innately impede equal justice for all.258  It 
therefore behooves attorneys to understand the emerging cognitive science 
research regarding implicit bias and decision-making.  Because awareness 
and the motivation to correct one’s thinking is the “best cure thus far” for 
implicit bias,259 state bar associations and law firms should follow the 
ABA’s lead to educate attorneys about this pervasive problem.260  With 
greater awareness among the legal community of how implicit biases 
operate, it is this author’s hope that researchers will explore and empirically 
test proposals to address the problems of implicit bias in our legal system, 
















257. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 3, 5 (1988) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 
(1921)). 
258. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON IMPLICIT BIAS, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/ 
initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
259. Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias: Implicit Bias Can Be 
Eliminated by Awareness, A.B.A., LITIGATION NEWS, Spring 2011, at 20, 20 available at 
http://www.charnalaw.com/documents/aba-litigation-news-implicit-bias.pdf. 
260. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON IMPLICIT BIAS, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/ 
initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
261. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal 
System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1581 (2013) (calling for “an expansion of some of the more 
promising concepts from psychological studies to a broader audience, including not just judges, but 
every lawyer, client, juror, witness, and court employee, before legal proceedings can begin in any 
given case”). 
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